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Abstract
In previous work, we described an Emergency Landing Plan-
ner (ELP) designed to assist pilots in choosing the best emer-
gency landing site when damage or failures occur in an air-
craft. In this paper, we briefly describe the system, but focus
on the integration of this system into the cockpit of a 6 DOF
full-motion simulator and a study designed to evaluate the
ELP. We discuss the results of this study, the lessons learned,
and some of the issues involved in advancing this work fur-
ther.
In a previous paper (Meuleau et al. 2009b), we described
an Emergency Landing Planner (ELP) designed to assist pi-
lots in choosing the best emergency landing site when dam-
age occurs to an aircraft. In 2010, we integrated our planning
software into the cockpit of a 6 DOF full-motion simula-
tor for 757/767 category transport aircraft, and performed
experiments to evaluate the software using crews of pro-
fessional airline pilots. In this paper we briefly review the
Emergency Landing Planner (ELP), but focus on three top-
ics:
• Integration of the software into the aircraft avionics
• Design and results of an experiment to evaluate the system
• Challenges to further advancing and fielding the technol-
ogy
1. The Emergency Landing Planner
Figure 1 illustrates the type of scenario that the ELP ad-
dresses. When damage or failures occur in an aircraft an
adaptive controller takes over to help stabilize and control
the aircraft. The ELP then provides the pilot with a ranked
set of possible emergency landing sites. Fundamentally, the
ELP is solving a 3D path planning problem with dynam-
ics. It does this by constructing a probabilistic roadmap of
points and edges that includes the current position of the air-
craft and an approach point to every possible runway within
a viable range. (This may cover hundreds of airports for an
aircraft at high altitude.) A sophisticated model of risk is
used to assess the probability of success for each edge in the
roadmap. This model of risk takes into account:
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Figure 1: Basic Scenario
• Control capabilities of the (damaged) aircraft
• Weather conditions in the area (e.g. thunderstorms, turbu-
lence, icing)
• Ceiling, visibility and winds at each possible landing site
• Instrument approaches available at the site (if any)
• Characteristics of the landing site (runway length, width,
condition)
• Emergency facilities at the site (fire, medical)
• Danger to population along the approach path
A∗ search is used to search the roadmap to find the best
options. The heuristic used to guide A∗ is a combination of
the risk associated with flying the remaining (Euclidean) dis-
tance to each runway, and the risk associated with approach
and landing at that runway.
Currently, the ELP only considers officially recognized
airports and runways (large and small). However, there is no
fundamental reason that additional sites could not be con-
sidered, including fields, highways, and waterways. Such
sites should probably not be considered unless the airport
options are exhausted or are too risky. The ELP makes two
additional assumptions:
1. Real time weather information is available to the aircraft
2. The flight envelope for the (damaged) aircraft is known1.
1For our purposes, the flight envelope of an aircraft is the four
dimensional space of airspeeds, bank angles, vertical speeds, and
altitudes in which the aircraft can operate.
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Figure 2: An example roadmap for an ELP scenario. The
vertical polygons are areas of thunderstorm or other weather
activity. Terrain obstacles (lower) are not shown.
The first of these assumptions is quite reasonable, given the
availability of satellite weather services and internet connec-
tivity for large aircraft. The second assumption is more op-
timistic. We will discuss this more in Section 5.. The flight
envelope does play a key role in the assessment of risk for
various options. For example, if a damaged aircraft must
maintain a higher airspeed than normal, additional runway
length is needed, and finding a runway with a strong head-
wind is important to lowering ground speed at touchdown.
Similarly, if the aircraft has limited ability to bank to the
right, a right crosswind or gusty conditions will be problem-
atic, as will paths that require sharp turns to the right.
The performance of the ELP is largely a function of the
number of points and edges in the roadmap. Currently, we
generate 1000 points and connect them to their 100 near-
est neighbors, which results in a roadmap with 100,000
edges. The A∗ search typically expands about 20 percent
of those edges for the scenarios we considered. With this
sized roadmap, the ELP produces an ordered list of options
for the pilot in under 6 seconds. This list can therefore be
refreshed and updated as often as desired, to account for the
aircraft movement, weather updates, or additional failures.
Our experience has been that paths generated from prob-
abilistic roadmaps of this density can be far from optimal,
and just don’t look very good when displayed. This prob-
lem can be addressed by dramatically increasing the density
of points and edges, but this approach also significantly in-
creases search time. The more practical solution is to use
local search to shorten and smooth paths. We do this local
search by constructing a second roadmap consisting only of
points along the path just found, creating a dense network
of edges among those points, and re-running A∗ on this re-
duced graph. The resulting paths are shorter, smoother, and
seem more natural when displayed.
More details about the risk model, the path planning, and
the local search can be found in (Meuleau et al. 2009b;
2009a; 2011)
Figure 3: The Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator (ACFS).
Figure 4: The cockpit of the ACFS.
2. Integration
Figures 3 and 4 show the Advanced Concepts Flight Simula-
tor (ACFS) at NASA Ames Research Center. The simulator
is representative of modern glass cockpit twin engine com-
mercial transport aircraft such as the Boeing 757, 767, and
Airbus A320. Unlike most large commercial flight simula-
tors, the code of this simulator has been “exposed” to allow
for experimentation with adaptive control software, damage
models, and experimental pilot aids and displays.
In normal operations, pilots view, enter, and modify des-
tination, route and approach information using a pair of key-
pads and displays (CDUs) located just above, and on either
side of the throttles (Figure 5). Information entered on a
CDU is communicated to the aircraft’s Flight Management
System (FMS), which interfaces with the autopilot and with
the various displays in the cockpit. When route information
is entered on a CDU, the route shows up as a dashed white
line on the pilot and co-pilots Navigation Displays (Figure
6). Once executed, the previous route disappears, and the
route becomes solid magenta.
Figure 5: A CDU showing the Departures/Arrivals page for
Denver (KDEN) airport. The emergency prompt appears
next to button 6R at the lower right.
To integrate the ELP into the aircraft cockpit, we needed
to make it accessible through the CDUs and make it commu-
nicate route information to the FMS, so that the emergency
routes would appear on the Navigation Displays. Further-
more, we wanted the pilots to be able to edit or change an
emergency route just as they can with any other route. As
a result, the ELP had to be fully integrated with the CDUs
and the FMS. In addition, we wanted to make the style of
the interface reasonably intuitive and consistent with exist-
ing CDU pages.
The ELP is accessed using button 6R from the Depar-
ture/Arrivals page (Figure 5). After a brief splash screen,
a set of ”Emergency Pages” is displayed, showing the op-
tions ordered from lowest to highest risk. Figure 7 shows
the first of four emergency pages for a scenario. Each entry
shows an airport, runway, runway length, distance, and di-
rection (magnetic bearing). The smaller symbols below each
entry indicate the principle risks associated with that option;
for example, RL indicates runway length is an issue, and CE
indicates that the cloud ceiling is close to the minimums for
the best approach to that runway. To select an entry, the but-
ton to the left of the entry is pressed. In this case, the first
entry has been selected by pressing button 1L, which causes
the route for that option to show up as a dashed white line on
the Navigation Displays, as shown in Figure 6. Pressing the
EXEC key would cause the route to become the current route
(solid magenta). The pilots can page through the options
using the NEXT PAGE and PREV PAGE buttons as desired.
To see more information about a particular option, the pilots
Figure 6: The Navigation Display showing both the current
route (magenta) and the new route being considered (dashed
white). Green, yellow, and orange areas indicate rain and
thunderstorm activity.
can press the button to the right of the option, which brings
up an airport information page showing runway information
and the current weather at the airport (Figure 8).
The screen size and lack of color on the CDUs limited
the amount of information we could convey for each option.
With greater screen real estate, we could display winds, ceil-
ing, and visibility information for each option. With color,
we could show the severity of the principal risks. It seems
likely that the displays and interfaces of future aircraft will
not be quite so limited.
In a previous study comparing different adaptive con-
trollers, Campbell et al 2010b; 2010a found that because
of the assistance of the adaptive controller, pilots were un-
aware of when they were approaching the boundaries of the
flight envelope. For example, pilots would slow the aircraft
too much on final approach, not recognizing that in doing so
they were nearing saturation of one or more control surfaces.
On reaching saturation, the nose of the aircraft would sud-
denly drop, or the aircraft would roll inverted, causing them
to lose control and crash. Since we were using an adaptive
controller in this experiment, we therefore felt that it was
essential to give the pilots some additional guidance on the
limitations of the flight envelope. To do this, we added color
bands to the primary flight display to indicate safe airspeeds,
bank angles, and vertical speeds as shown in Figure 9. If the
airspeed, bank angle and vertical speed remain in the green
regions the aircraft can be readily controlled. However, as
airspeed decays down into the yellow (not yet visible in the
figure), the green regions for bank and climb rate shrink,
ultimately to nothing. The size of the regions is dictated by
the 4-dimensional model of the flight envelope, which varies
depending on the damage or failure. The green regions for
bank can be asymmetric, as is the case when there is damage
to a wing or aileron.
Figure 7: The first of four emergency pages for a scenario.
Each page can show up to five options.
3. The Experiment
To evaluate the ELP, we developed a set of scenarios in-
volving different locations, different flight plans, different
weather conditions and different damage models. There
were three different locations, two flight plans for each lo-
cation, two different weather severities, and three different
damage models, for a total of 36 possibilities. The dam-
age models were previously developed at NASA Langley
through a combination of vortex lattice code and wind tun-
nel testing. The number of scenarios we could consider was
necessarily limited by: the number of damage models avail-
able in the simulator; the number of realistic weather models
we could develop; and the time required to test all the pos-
sible emergency flight plans and approaches that might be
produced for each location.
In addition to the scenarios, we needed a baseline with
which to compare the ELP. We therefore developed a simple
aid for the pilots that just listed the nearby airports grouped
by runway length. We also developed an intermediate aid
that evaluated runways using our risk model, but did not
consider en route weather, an did not generate a path for
the pilots. The matrix of testing possibilities is summarized
in Table 10.
To carry out the experiments, we employed 5 teams of
professional pilots for two days each. All of these pi-
lots were either current or recently retired airline pilots
with experience in glass cockpit aircraft of the appropriate
type. Each pilot team was briefed on the functioning of the
ELP and baseline aids, and conducted several short training
flights to ensure they were comfortable with the systems and
handling of the simulator. The team was then subjected to
16 of the possible scenario/aid combinations. Each run be-
gan in cruise flight. Damage was introduced after 1-3 min-
Figure 8: An Airport Information page showing runways
and current weather for KCAO.
utes, resulting in a master caution alarm in the cockpit, and
indications of the failures on a display of the control sur-
faces shown in Figure 11. The pilots would then utilize the
aid provided, chose an emergency landing site, and fly the
aircraft until touchdown or loss of control. In some cases
we also terminated the run after a decision was reached, be-
cause of time limitations. A typical run lasted about 35-40
minutes. At the end of the run, the pilots were asked to
fill out a brief questionnaire about their decisions and about
their assessment of the aid provided by the software. At
the end of the two day period, the pilots were asked to fill
out a longer questionnaire giving their overall impressions,
criticisms, and suggestions for the emergency aids and inter-
faces.
During the runs, we observed the pilot performance from
a control room with video screens of all major cockpit in-
struments (Figure 12). We collected multiple data streams
including: video and audio from the cockpit; aircraft state
at 30 Hz (location, altitude, airspeed, pitch, bank, control
settings, etc.); keystrokes and display from the CDUs; and
video of the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and Navigation
Display (ND).
From the outset, we were aware that there were some se-
rious limitations with the study:
1. The number of possible runs was limited because of both
time and cost.
2. The number of different scenarios was limited because of
the amount of data required and the difficulty of construct-
ing the scenarios. As a result, the pilots could become
familiar with scenarios and damage models as the study
progressed.
3. The pilots could become fatigued, particularly later in the
day.
Figure 9: The Primary Flight Display (PFD) showing bank
angle, pitch, airspeed, vertical speed, altitude and heading.
























Figure 10: Experiment test matrix.
The first of these limitations makes it difficult to draw sta-
tistically significant conclusions. In any study dealing with
human subjects, there is a great deal of variability and ran-
domness, so large sample sizes are needed. The cost of the
simulator and pilots makes this impractical.
The second limitation, the limited number of scenarios,
meant that the pilots became increasingly “contaminated” as
the study progressed. We tried to minimize this by mixing
up the different damage models, weather conditions, loca-
tions, and flight plans. However, the pilots clearly became
more familiar with the terrain and airports in each region,
and their skill with the different damage models improved
over time. To attempt to average out these effects, we or-
dered the scenarios differently for the different crews.
The third limitation, pilot fatigue, seemed to show up pri-
marily during the afternoon of the second day of testing. We
noticed it because there were some cases where the pilots
lost control of the aircraft and crashed during easier scenar-
ios.
The combination of these limitations means that many of
our results are anecdotal, are based on small sample sizes,
or are the results of subjective feedback from the pilots.
Figure 11: Surface position display showing status and de-
flection of control surfaces. In this case, the left wing is
damaged and the left aileron has failed (red). As a result, the
adaptive controller is using right up aileron (blue) and right
spoilers (blue) to keep the aircraft from rolling left. When a
control surface is saturated (at its limits) it turns yellow.
4. Results
Figure 13 is a trajectory plot showing the options considered
by the pilots for one particular run. The red dot indicates the
position of the aircraft at the time damage occurs. The black
line is the aircraft’s actual trajectory. Yellow lines indicate
other options considered by the pilots, and the green line in-
dicates the route provided by the ELP at the time they finally
made a decision. As can be seen from the plot, the pilots
made a tighter turn to the left (back towards the airport) than
the ELP recommended. They also chose to intercept and get
established on the final approach course further from the air-
port. In this run, damage was to the left wing and aileron,
making it more difficult to turn right. In addition the weather
was challenging, with larger airports in the area having low
ceilings, poor visibility, or difficult crosswinds. In this case,
KCAO runway 02 was the highest ranked option provided
by the ELP, and it proved to be one of few choices for which
pilots had any success in getting the aircraft on the ground.
The blue path shows the route that would have been recom-
mended if the pilots had made their decision instantly after
the damage occurred. By the time the decision was made, it
was no longer practical to make a right turn towards the cho-
sen runway, given the control characteristics of the aircraft.
Figure 14 shows a run for a different scenario in the same
general area. In this run, damage was to the horizontal sta-
bilizer and elevator so turning was not difficult, but a higher
airspeed had to be maintained to preserve enough airflow
over the remaining elevator. In this case, pilots were tempted
by long runways at lower ranked Colorado Springs (KCOS)
and Cannon Air Force Base (KCVS), but winds and weather
did not favor the available runways. They ended up choosing
a more highly ranked option with a shorter runway (KCVN
04), because of the strong headwind straight down the run-
Figure 12: The ACFS control room.
Figure 13: A trajectory plot for a left wing damage scenario.
way. In this case, KCAO 02 would have also been a good
choice for the same reason.
In analyzing the data, we considered the time required to
make a decision, and the pilots success rate as a function of
the damage model, weather conditions, and location for each
different emergency aid. Our initial hypothesis was that that
the ELP would prove helpful to the pilots in cases where ei-
ther the damage or weather was severe, but that the pilots
would do just fine with the baseline emergency aid when the
weather and damage were both benign. This hypothesis is
only partially correct; weather severity was a factor, damage
severity was not. For the scenarios involving mild weather
conditions, the ELP does not seem to offer any objective im-
provement in pilot performance over the two simpler emer-
gency aids. However, when the weather was poor, the ELP
generally led to quicker decisions. The reason for this is that
when the weather was mild, one of the nearby large airports
with a long runway was usually the best choice. Pilots could
Figure 14: A second trajectory plot for a scenario with ele-
vator damage.
find this choice easily enough using only the simpler emer-
gency aid, and could choose the most appropriate runway
by looking at the airport information page for that airport.
In contrast, when the weather was poor the pilots would be
forced to look at many different options before finding one
with acceptable weather conditions. In a few particularly
difficult cases, pilots took more than 20 minutes to reach a
decision using the baseline emergency aid. With the ELP,
decisions for these same scenarios were made in 4-5 min-
utes.
From the objective data, the paths constructed by the ELP
did not seem to offer a significant advantage to the pilots
either in terms of decision making time, or in terms of de-
cision quality. When intervening weather was not an issue,
a direct route to a point about 10 miles out on the final ap-
proach course was appropriate and was relatively easy for
them to construct. Even when the weather was more severe,
the pilots were able to construct their own paths, although
it took them longer to do so. For this reason, pilots sub-
jectively reported that it was a lot easier to have the assis-
tance of the ELP in all cases, both because of the ranking
of options, and because the route was constructed automati-
cally and guaranteed terrain clearance. Thus, even for mild
weather conditions, pilots preferred the ELP, and felt that it
reduced workload.
In contrast to our hypothesis, the severity of the damage
does not seem to be correlated with whether or not the ELP
provides an advantage. For mild weather, but severe dam-
age, there is no objective evidence that the ELP provides an
advantage over the baseline emergency aid. Likewise, for
severe weather, the advantage of the ELP over the baseline
aid does not become any more pronounced if the damage is
severe. We speculate that this is largely due to the adaptive
controller – it does such a good job of stabilizing the aircraft
that the pilots have time to investigate options and construct
routes manually. Without the adaptive controller the work-
load is much higher since it is much more of a struggle to
maintain control of the aircraft. In this case the pilots would
likely not have time to consider multiple options, or con-
struct routes manually.
Overall, we were both surprised and thrilled with the en-
thusiastic response we received from the pilots, as illustrated
by this quote:
As a Captain for the past twenty some years I’ve trained
for emergencies frequently and the most difficult part is
selecting and getting the aircraft on the ground when
a immediate landing is called for. Your software pro-
gram alleviates the uncertainty about finding a suitable
landing site and also reduces workload so the Crew can
concentrate on “flying” the aircraft.
Although the technology was designed for next generation
aircraft, several pilots indicated that they wanted to see
this capability in their existing aircraft and suggested that
it would be particularly valuable in time critical situations
like cargo fires, loss of engine power, rapid fuel or hydraulic
fluid loss, or medical emergencies. Ironically, during our
study a brand new UPS 747 crashed in Dubai as the result of
a cargo fire. The pilots chose to return to the takeoff airport,
although closer options were available. This proved to be a
fatal mistake, as the smoke became so thick that the captain
could no longer see his instruments.
We have two final observations relevant to pilot training.
The first is that there were significant differences in pilot
performance. Two of the three damage scenarios required
approach and landing at considerably higher speeds than the
pilots were accustomed to. Those pilots with experience in
high speed military aircraft did much better at this than those
without that experience. Although rare, several actual dam-
age incidents have had this characteristic, so regular simu-
lator training in high speed landings would potentially be
valuable.
The second observation is that many pilots preferred long
runways with poor weather and wind conditions to shorter
runways with better weather and winds. For example, sev-
eral teams were seduced by the 13,000 ft runway at Col-
orado Springs, even though it was ranked low because the
visibility was 1 mile in blowing snow, with a strong 70 de-
gree crosswind. This proved fatal in almost every case. In
contrast the top ranked option only had a 7000 ft runway,
but had good visibility and a strong headwind straight down
the runway. The crews that chose this option were generally
successful. This lends some credence to our risk model, and
suggests that pilots should be trained to favor better wind
and weather conditions over longer runways in emergency
situations.
5. Challenges and Regrets
As we expected, the experiment made us aware of many
ways in which the ELP could be improved. Some of these
are concerned with the robustness of the communication in-
terface between the ELP and the cockpit CDUs and FMS,
some are improvements to the user interface and informa-
tion layout on the CDUs. The most important involves im-
provements to the risk model and to the path planner. For
the risk model, we recognized that we need to increase the
risk for crosswinds and gusts in cases where the aircraft has
limited yaw control (rudder damage). We also recognized
that ground speed at touchdown should be weighted more
heavily due to the likelihood of tires blowing at high speeds.
Finally, we did not consider the terrain roughness along and
in the vicinity of the approach path – this was clearly a fac-
tor that the pilots considered when choosing options, partic-
ularly when controllability was limited.
For the path planner, we found that the pilots tended to
prefer a gentler turn to intercept the final approach course
and a longer final approach course, as illustrated by Figure
13. This was particularly true when controllability was poor.
While these are all relatively simple improvements, they il-
lustrate the need for further testing and refinement of the
models. They also indicate that the path planning needs to
incorporate more ”knowledge” about flying; when close to
the ground, more precision is required, causing the pilots to
prefer gentler turns, and gentle course intercepts.
If we had it to do over again, we would split the experi-
ment into two phases: in the first phase, we would remove
the decision making aspect and have pilots fly approaches
to many different airports with various damage models and
weather conditions. We could then use this information to
improve the risk model and path planning. In a second phase
we would then evaluate the role of the ELP in helping the pi-
lots to make quicker and better decisions.
Unfortunately, getting software like the ELP into the
cockpit of commercial transport aircraft is a difficult pro-
cess. The certification process for commercial avionics is
both time consuming and costly. It’s also not clear how to
verify that the ELP will give the best recommendations in
all cases, which opens up the manufacturers to additional li-
ability concerns. Although we are beginning to talk to avion-
ics manufacturers, there are other possible ways of fielding
some of this technology that may prove much easier. An
increasing number of general aviation pilots are now us-
ing handheld devices in the cockpit for maps, charts, and
GPS navigation. Such devices range from specially de-
signed units like the Garmin GPSMAP 695/696 to Avia-
tion apps like Foreflight HD for the Apple iPad. Much of
the ELP’s capability could be incorporated into such a unit,
with the advantage that certification is not required. The
disadvantage is that tight integration with the aircraft avion-
ics and autopilot are not possible with this solution. A sec-
ond possibility is to work with an airline or freight carrier to
make the technology available through the ACARS system.
ACARS is a datalink system that allows communication of
data between dispatching centers and aircraft cockpits. The
information is accessed through special pages on the cockpit
CDU. Using this approach, the ELP could be based on the
ground, and recommendations would be sent to the CDU
through ACARS. This also has the advantage that certifica-
tion is unnecessary, and that the dispatching center would be
aware of and could assist with the emergency. We are just
beginning to explore these possible avenues for fielding this
technology, but hope to forge a partnership with one or more
of these players.
The biggest assumption behind this work is that the flight
envelope for the damaged aircraft is completely known. For
certain categories of failures such as engine failures and con-
trol surface failures, the flight envelope can be computed
and tested in advance and stored in a library. However,
the effects of arbitrary damage are more difficult to pre-
dict and it therefore seems unreasonable to suppose that
complete models for these conditions are available in a li-
brary. In stabilizing the aircraft, the adaptive controller ex-
plores portions of the flight envelope, and learns how deflec-
tions of the control surfaces affect the aircraft. As a result,
the adaptive controller can provide a partial model of the
flight envelope as well as some knowledge about areas of
the envelope that are likely to exceed control limits. How-
ever, there may still be areas of the flight envelope that are
only partially known. The most conservative approach is to
only consider solutions that remain within the known por-
tion of the flight envelope. However, further exploration
of the envelope might result in the ability to produce bet-
ter solutions (for example, slowing the aircraft could allow
a shorter runway to be used). Of course, exploration of
the flight envelope involves risk, which must be balanced
by any potential gains. In general, this problem becomes
a POMDP since we have beliefs about the flight envelope,
and we can refine those beliefs through actions that explore
the flight envelope. But those actions could also throw us
into an undesirable and unrecoverable state. Fortunately,
flight envelopes do not appear to be this ill-behaved as a
rule. As one moves into a particular state in the control
envelope, one gains knowledge of the surrounding states,
by virtue of how close the control surfaces are to satura-
tion. It is therefore possible to explore the boundaries of
the known control envelope and learn what additional states
can be explored without undue risk. We have developed a
prototype planner that can generate conditional plans that
explore portions of the flight envelope and select different
landing options based on the outcome of those exploration
actions. Surprisingly, this planner is proving to be much
more efficient than we expected and we now believe it may
be possible to do this in practice. A more detailed descrip-
tion of this work can be found in (Meuleau and Smith 2011;
Meuleau et al. 2010). This approach does raise a difficult
user interface issue: how does one depict conditional plans
of this sort for pilots? Perhaps the best approach is to only
display the most probable path and landing site with some
indication that there are decision points along the way.
A second assumption we have made is that the flight en-
velope remains constant once damage has occurred. It is
always possible that additional failures may occur, causing
the flight envelope to change again. Unless these subse-
quent failures are predictable, the best that can be done is
to run the ELP again when the failure occurs. A more dif-
ficult situation is when the flight envelope changes continu-
ously over time. As an example consider the situation where
the left wing is damaged and fuel is leaking out at a rapid
rate. Initially, there is loss of lift on the left wing and the
aircraft has a tendency to roll to the left. As fuel contin-
ues to leak out, the left wing becomes lighter counteracting
the loss of lift. As more fuel leaks out, the right wing be-
comes heavy and the aircraft develops a tendency to roll to
the right. Whether or not one prefers a left or a right cross-
wind on landing therefore depends on how long it will take
to get to the runway. To our knowledge, the problem of path
planning with continuously changing dynamics has not been
addressed in the literature. We think that our approach of
doing A∗ search over a probabilistic roadmap should still be
effective, but the heuristic must take into account the esti-
mate of the time that will be required to reach the runway,
so that the landing risk can be evaluated using a reasonably
accurate estimate of what the flight envelope will be at the
time.
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